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COMMENTS
each case) so affected by the amendment shall be
necessary for its adoption. (Section 34, C)
(3) The term for which a corporation is created
may be extended by amendment. (Section 34, A)
(4) Any amendment which might be adopted at
a meeting may be adopted without a meeting if writ-
ten consent to the amendment has been given by all
members entitled to vote. (Section 34, E)
NOTE D. Section 35 requires the filing of articles of amend-
ment with the parish recorders of mortgages and the
Secretary of State, and sets forth the prescribed
manner.
ARTICLE XIII. INCORPORATORS
THE NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF THE INCORPORATORS OF THIS
CORPORATION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
SEE SECTION 3, A (6) )
(The articles should conclude with the signatures of all
incorporators, two witnesses and the notary's attestation of au-
thenticity. See Section 3, A.)
JURISDICTION TO LEVY INHERITANCE TAXES
The problem of jurisdiction to tax is one of constitutional
law. In the field of death taxes,' the jurisdictional question is
of importance to the taxpayer, his estate planner, and the state
legislator, especially in view of the possibility of multiple taxa-
tion.
Prior to the beginning of the present century, it was gen-
erally conceded in the United States that the entire movable
estate 2 of a decedent would be taxed only by the domiciliary
state. This practice was applied to tangibles as well as intan-
gibles under the doctrine of mobilia sequuntur personam. How-
1. Forty-seven states have some form of death tax; Nevada is the only
state that does not impose any such taxes. An inheritance tax is not a tax
upon the property itself but on the privilege or right to inherit. Succession
of Papp, 146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1919). Estate taxes are based on the power
to transmit or the transmission from the dead to the living. Frick v.
Lewelleyn, 298 Fed. 803 (W.D. Pa. 1924).
2. It is well settled that only the state where the land is located may
collect an inheritance tax as applied to land. Therefore the taxability
of real estate is not discussed. See Succession of Westfeldt, 122 La. 836, 48
So. 281 (1909) and authorities cited therein.
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ever, in 1903, in Blackstone v. Miller,3 the United States Supreme
Court held that there was no constitutional prohibition 4 against
multiple taxation, and that, therefore, both Illinois, the state of
the domicile of the decedent, and New York could collect inheri-
tance taxes on a bank deposit in the latter state. The court sus-
tained the tax levied by New York on the ground that power
over the person of the debtor confers jurisdiction.
In Frick v. Pennsylvania,5 decided in 1925, the state of the
decedent's domicile was denied the power to collect an inheri-
tance tax based on tangible personal property located perma-
nently out of the state. The court held that the property, by
reason of its character and situs, was wholly under the jurisdic-
tion of other states (Massachusetts and New York) and was not
under the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania simply because the dece-
dent was domiciled there. The court assumed the power to
allocate jurisdiction among the states and thus gave new mean-
ing to its expression, taxation "without such jurisdiction is
mere extortion, and in contravention of due process of law."
The power of the states to resort to multiple taxation of
intangibles was denied in Farmers Loan and Trust Company v.
Minnesota,7 expressly overruling Blackstone v. Miller. Minnesota,
the state of the domicile of the debtor, attempted to collect an in-
heritance tax on an obligation owed to a nonresident decedent.
In holding the tax to be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the court reasoned that the general grounds precluding
taxation of tangibles by two states should apply with equal force
to intangibles with taxable situs imposed by due application of
the legal fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam8 In his dissent-
ing opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes declared that there is no consti-
tutional objection to the taxation of a transaction by two states,
if the laws of both must be invoked to give legal effect to the
transaction." The dissent also observed, "a good deal has to be read
3. 188 U.S. 189, 23 S.Ct. 277, 47 L.Ed. 439 (1903).
4. As to the constitutional issues the court held: "The tax does not
deprive the plaintiff in error of any of the privileges and immunities of the
citizens of New York," and "It does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment."
188 U.S. 189, 207, 23 S.Ct. 277, 279, 47 LEd. 439, 445.
5. 268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058, 42 A.L.R. 316 (1925). Cf. Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 S.Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed. 150
(1905).
6. 268 U.S. 473, 492, 45 S.Ct. 603, 605, 69 L.Ed. 1058, 1063 (1925).
7. 280 U.S. 204, 50 S.Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed. 371, 65 A.L.R. 1000 (1930). See also
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 S.Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056, 72 A.L.R. 1303
(1930).
8. 280 U.S. 204, 211, 50 S.Ct. 98, 100, 74 L.Ed. 371, 375 (1930).
9. 280 U.S. 204, 216, 50 S.Ct. 98, 102, 74 L.Ed. 371, 377.
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into the Fourteenth Amendment to give it any bearing upon this
case."10
The doctrine of "exclusive power to tax," apparently based
on the Fourteenth Amendment, was applied to corporate stock
in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,11 in which the state
of incorporation was denied the power to collect an inheritance
tax upon the death of a nonresident stockholder. Affirming the
"single tax" theory, the court held: "A transfer from the dead
to the living of any specific property is an event single in charac-
ter and is effected under the laws, and occurs within the limits,
of a particular state; and it is unreasonable, and incompatible with
a sound construction of the due process of law clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to hold that jurisdiction to tax that event
may be distributed among a number of states. '12 Again, a minority
of the court was of the opinion that no principle of constitutional
interpretation would warrant the conclusion that taxation by
both states, reaching the same economic interest with respect
to which the stockholder has sought and secured the benefits of
the laws of both, is so arbitrary or oppressive as to merit con-
demnation as a denial of due process of law. '1 3
Under the doctrine established by the foregoing cases, the
problem of multiple taxation no longer existed regarding tan-
gible or intangible personalty, and the estate planner could act
with reasonable certainty. But in 1939 history began to repeat
itself and multiple taxation of intangibles was sustained in Curry
v. McCanless.14 A decedent, domiciled in Tennessee, transferred
to a trustee in Alabama certain securities to be held in trust.
In an action for a declaratory judgment, it was held that both
Tennessee and Alabama could validly subject the trust property
to transfer taxes. It was found that both states extended pro-
tection to the various legal relations springing from the trust
and that the testatrix invoked the aid of the law of both states,
and her legatees must do likewise in order to enjoy the benefits
of the succession. As to the constitutionality of the taxes, the
court held: "We can find nothing in the history of the Four-
teenth Amendment and no support in reason, principle, or au-
10. 280 U.S. 204, 218, 50 S.Ct. 98, 103, 74 L.Ed. 371, 378.
11. 284 U.S. 312, 52 S.Ct. 174, 76 L.Ed. 313, 77 A.L.R. 1401 (1932).
12. 284 U.S. 312, 327, 52 S.Ct. 174, 177, 76 L.Ed. 313, 319.
13. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in which Mr. Justice Holmes
and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred. 284 U.S. 312, 333, 52 S.Ct. 174, 179, 76
L.Ed. 313, 323.
14. 307 U.S. 357, 59 S.Ct. 900, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1939).
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thority for saying that it prohibits either state, in the circum-
stances of this case, from laying the tax."' 5
Three years after the Curry case, the "single tax" theory
was completely destroyed in State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich. 6 Utah, the state of incorporation, attempted to collect an
inheritance tax after the death of a non-resident stockholder.
In overruling First National Bank v. Maine, the court said that
any state which has extended benefits or protection or 'can dem-
onstrate the practical fact of its power or sovereignty as respects
the shares may constitutionally make its exaction, and that Utah
was not restrained by the Fourteenth Amendment from taxing
the transfer. The court was little concerned with any ill effects
of multiple taxation and clearly stated that it was not within
its province to provide any other system, for to do so "would
violate the first principles of constitutional adjudication to strike
down state legislation on the basis of our individual views or
preferences as to policy, whether the state laws deal with taxes
or other subjects of social or economic legislation."'1 7 Once again
it is a matter of state concern to provide against multiple taxa-
tion. The various states have used several devices to avoid mul-
tiple taxation with the principal method being reciprocal exemp-
tion and immunity statutes. 8
In expressing its attitude toward multiple taxation, the Lou-
isiana Legislature in 1940 passed an act declaring the transfer of
intangibles owned b~y nonresident decedents not to be subject to
taxation.19 As a result of this legislation it has been said that
Louisiana is among the nineteen American jurisdictions which
"have optimistically rested upon exemption or immunity stat-
utes, without reciprocal features to lessen the impact of multiple
state taxation. '20 Thus all transfers of intangibles of a non-resi-
dent decedent escape taxation in Louisiana, even though the
transfer of intangibles of Louisiana residents may not escape
taxation elsewhere, since the Louisiana statute does not contain
15. 307 U.S. 357, 372, 59 S.Ct. 900, 908, 83 L.Ed. 1339, 1351.
16. 316 U.S. 174, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 86 L.Ed. 1358, 139 A.L.R. 1436 (1942).
17. 316 U.S. 174, 181, 62 S.Ct. 1008, 1012, 86 L.Ed. 1358, 1370.
18. For an analysis and classification of the reciprocal exemption and
immunity features of the laws of all the states, see Freedman, Practical
Aspects of Multiple State Taxation of Intangibles of Nonresident Decedents
Since the Aldrich Case (1948) 24 Notre Dame Lawyer 41, and Note (1940) 26
Iowa L. Rev. 694.
19. "No tax [shall] be imposed upon any transfer of intangibles, how-
ever used or held, whether in trust or otherwise, by a person, or by reason
of the death of a person, who was not domiciled in this state at the time of
his death." La. Act 67 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1949) § 8556.1].
20. Freedman, supra note 18, at 43.
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a reciprocity clause. Apparently our exemption statute has
worked satisfactorily, for in their comments on the Louisiana
Inheritance Tax Act 21 the Commissioners of the Revenue Code
have not recommended any substantial changes in this respect. 22
Any loss of revenue to the state because of the fiat exemption
provision is probably offset by the resulting inducement to non-
residents to invest capital in Louisiana.
Although the transfer of intangibles owned by nonresidents
are exempt from taxation, the transfer of those owned by Louisi-
ana residents are subject to the tax regardless of the location of
such intangibles.23 In Succession of Rosenthal,24 where the resi-
dent testator bequeathed to a nonresident bonds which were
never physically within the state, the transfer was held subject
to Louisiana inheritance tax. Since the rights evidenced by the
bonds were held to be intangibles, Louisiana unquestionably has
the jurisdiction to collect such taxes.
The transfer of tangible personal property of nonresidents
having a situs in Louisiana is subject to the Louisiana inheri-
tance tax.25 This is in accord with well-established rules of juris-
diction to tax. However, the same section of the act declares
that the tax shall be imposed with respect to all personal prop-
erty owned by the residents of the State of Louisiana, wherever
situated. The statute as worded is broad enough to include tan-
gible personal property permanently situated out of the state.26
Yet, under the rule of the Frick case, Louisiana is without juris-
diction to tax the transfer of such property. The inconsistency
of a rule which allows the domiciliary state, in the case of trans-
fers upon the death of a resident, to levy a tax with respect to
intangibles wherever situated but not with respect to tangibles
has been pointed out in several instances . 2  However, the United
States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the rule of the
21. La. Act 127 of 1921 (E.S.) as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8556 et
seq.]. See Comment (1948) 22 Tulane L. Rev. 635.
22. Projet of a Revenue Code for the State of Louisiana (1948) § 964.
23. La. Act 127 of 1921(E.S.) § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8557].
24. 163 La. 673, 112 So. 525 (1927).
25. La. Act 127 of 1921 (E.S.) § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8557].
26. The wording in the projet is even more explicit: "Said tax shall be
imposed with respect to . . . all movable property, tangible or intangible,
owned by residents of the State of Louisiana, wherever situated." Projet
of a Revenue Code for the State of Louisiana (1948) § 964.
27. See, for example, Annotation, Succession tax at domicil of debtor
or corporation as to credits or corporate stock belonging to estate of non-
resident (1942) 139 A.L.R. 1458, 1462.
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Frick case allowing only one state to collect succession taxes with
respect to tangible personalty.28
In addition to the inheritance tax, Louisiana has an estate
transfer tax.2 9 The legislatively declared purpose of the act is
"to obtain for this state the benefit of the credit allowed under
the provision of Title III, Section 301, Subsection (b) of the
Federal Revenue Act of 1926, or under Subsection (b) of Section
813 of the Federal Internal Revenue Code, to the extent that this
state may be entitled under the said provisions, by imposing
additional taxes; and this subchapter shall be liberally construed
to effect that purpose. '30 Thus, the tax is not levied with respect
to any particular property of a decedent but with respect to-the
federal basic estate tax. As such it would comprehend all of the
property of the deceased which was included in the gross estate
for federal purposes. To the extent that the federal tax is based
on tangible personalty with a permanent situs outside of this
state, the Louisiana act should be inapplicable.3 1 However, the
administrator or executor would gain nothing by raising such
an objection. If Louisiana could not collect the tax, the federal
credit would then be reduced, resulting in a payment to the fed-
eral government instead of the state government.
The shortcomings of the inheritance taxes are not as evident
in the written law as in its enforcement. In their preliminary
report, the code commissioners noted: "We feel constrained, if
not compelled, to observe that the present enforcement of these
taxes is so lax as to constitute, in many sections of the state,
little or no enforcement at all."'32 In reference to the Estate
Transfer Act they said: "The most glaring and inescapable
observation compelled by the practical operation of the law is
that here exists an available source of substantial amounts of
additional revenue for the State of Louisiana, to which it is justly
entitled, and which would cost the taxpayers of Louisiana noth-
ing, because where the tax is not paid to Louisiana, it must be
and is paid to the Federal Government."
33
Louisiana has one of the lowest inheritance tax rates in the
28. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 70 S.Ct. 1 (U.S. 1949).
29. La. Act 119 of 1932 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8581 et seq.]
30. La. Act 119 of 1932, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8584].
31. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 45 S.Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058, 42
A.L.R. 316 (1925). See Treichler v. Wisconsin, 70 S.Ct. 1 (U.S. 1949), where
the challenged tax was computed with reference to the Wisconsin and fed-
eral taxes.
32. Preliminary Report of the Louisiana Revenue Code Commission
(1946) 117.
33. Id. at 118.
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country and should it be found that the revenue therefrom is
not what it should be, it is hoped that the legislature will provide
for proper enforcement of the tax rather than increase the rates
or extend the tax to transfers of property which are not now
subject to it.
SIDNEY A. CHAMPAGNE*
COMPUTATION OF THE LEGITIME WHEN ESTATE OF
DECEASED CONSISTS OF ASSETS IN SEVERAL STDATES
Limitations on freedom of testation are common in this coun-
try.' Provisions which reserve some portion of a decedent's
estate to the surviving spouse are found in some form in all states,
varying from the ancient institutions of dower and curtesy
to the idea of "forced portion" as provided by the Louisiana Civil
Code,2 or "hell-fire" statutes limiting a testator's freedom to leave
his estate to charity where he either is survived by close rela-
tives or attempts to make the charitable gift during his last ill-
ness.3
Two main types of statutes which restrict freedom of testa-
tion must be distinguished at this point: First, those statutes
which reserve an "indefeasible share" to "forced heirs,' 4 exem-
plified by Article 1493 of the Louisiana Civil Code;5 second, those
statutes which limit to a certain fraction of the estate the share
disposable by the testator either generally or in favor of certain
recipients, especially charities, but do not reserve any defeasible
share to specific members of the testator's family." The Califor-
nia "hell-fire" statute is a good illustration of the second type.7
That statute provides, in effect, that a testator who leaves certain
* Graduate of February 1950; presently member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. Kuhn, Comparative Commentaries on Private International Law
(1937) 333; Rheinstein, Cases on Decedent's Estates (1 ed. 1947) 403; Bres-
laur, Conflict of Laws in Restriction on Freedom of Testation (1942) 27 Iowa
L. Rev. 425, n. 3, 426 n. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
2. Arts. 1493, 1494, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1937) § 41.
4. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 1, at 439: "In contrast to the laws of
the Civil Law countries, the laws of the several states of the United States,
with the sole exception of Louisiana, do not grant an undefeasible share
to the descendants of a testator. However, American law has developed
some devices by which some measure of protection against disinheritance
is established for all, or for certain groups of, the descendants."
5. "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa can not exceed two-thirds
of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease, a legitimate
child, one-half, if he leaves two children; and one-third, if he leaves three
or a greater number. .."
6. Bordwell, Statute Law of Wills (1928) 14 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 172, 196-
198.
7. See note 3, supra.
